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Abstract 
 
A farm-level and village level models are discussed and tested empirically using spatial 
data, for exploring the cross-effects between population density and land inequality in 
the “tragedy of the commons”. Malthus himself argued that “An unfavourable distribution 
of produce, by prematurely diminishing the demand for labour, might retard the increase 
of food at an early period, in the same manner as if cultivation and population had been 
further advanced;” [Malthus (1830): pp. 239]. By exploring the farm and village level 
institutions and incentives for allocating land and labor to conservation or agriculture, 
the paper argues that inequality exacerbates the population pressure over the provision 
of  environmental  services,  and  that  under  more  equal  distribution  of  land,  more 
sustainable technological adaptations may happen in which better farm and land-use 
practices emerge, decreasing the level of land degradation. 
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RECURSOS DE USO COMUN Y EFECTOS CRUZADOS DE LA 
DENSIDAD POBLACIONAL Y LA DESIGUALDAD EN LA PROVISION 
DE BIENES Y SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES LOCALES 
 
Resumen 
 
Dos  modelos  a  nivel  de  finca  y  a  nivel  de  comunidad  se  discuten  y  prueban 
empíricamente  usando  datos  geo-referenciados,  para  explorar  los  efectos  cruzados 
entre  la  densidad  poblacional  y  la  desigualdad  en  la  distribución  de  la  tierra  en  la 
“tragedia  de  los  comunes”.  Malthus  mismo  argumentó  que  “una  distribución 
desfavorable de la producción, al reducir prematuramente la demanda por mano de 
obra, podría retardar el aumento en la producción de alimentos en un período mas 
temprano” [Malthus (1830): pp. 239]. Al explorar los incentivos e instituciones a nivel de 
finca y de vereda para la asignación de tierra y trabajo en actividades de conservación 
o en agricultura, el artículo argumenta que la desigualdad exacerba la presión de la 
población sobre la provisión de servicios ambientales, y que bajo una mejor distribución 
de tierra, mas adaptaciones tecnológicas sostenibles pueden ocurrir en donde mejores 
prácticas de uso del suelo emergen, reduciendo el nivel de degradación de la tierra. 
 
 
Palabras  clave:  tragedia  de  los  comunes,  población,  desigualdad,  degradación 
ambiental, agricultura sostenible. 
 
Clasificación JEL: O120, Q120, Q150, Q200, Q240, Q560  
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LOCAL COMMONS AND CROSS-EFFECTS OF POPULATION AND 
INEQUALITY ON THE LOCAL PROVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
SERVICES 
 
 
-Introduction.  –1.  Population,  Inequality  and  Cooperation  for  local  commons 
conservation.  -2.  Farm  and  Village  Models: Why  there  might  be  some  cross-effects 
between  population  density  and  group  heterogeneity  in  the  village.  -3.  Empirical 
evidence of the cross-effects of inequality and population density in the Andes. -4. Final 
Discussion: Natural and social capital, Natural and Social resilience. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“It  is  unquestionably  true,  that  in  no  country  in  the  globe  have  the 
government, the distribution of property, and the habits of people, been 
such as to call forth, in the most effective manner, the resources of the 
soil.  Consequently,  if  the  most  advantageous  possible  changes  in  all 
these respects could be supposed at once to take place, it is certain that 
the demand for labour, and the encouragement to production, might be 
such as for the short time, in some countries, and for rather a longer time 
in others, to lessen the operation of the checks to population which have 
been described.” [Malthus (1830): pp. 247] 
 
 
The majority of possible explanations for the tragedies of natural resources for which 
excludability  and  rivalry  over  their  use  are  partial,  focus  on  two  major  themes,  the 
pressure  from  increasing  population  and  the  problem  of  assigning  and  enforcing 
property rights. On the first theme, there seems to prevail the almost unanimous notion 
that population growth is nothing less than one of the most crucial threats to maintaining 
the global and local commons. On the second topic, a vast portion of the literature has 
focused  on  the  problems  of  defining  and  enforcing  appropriate  property  rights  over 
those  natural  resources  under  open  access  by  users.  But  only  until  recently,  less 
discussed  and  studied  in  this  second  theme  is  the  problem  of  distribution  of  those 
property rights among the direct and indirect users of the commons. 
 
Most agree that the definition and enforcement of property rights over the commons can 
be rather difficult and costly, which has brought back the interest on alternative forms of 
management  such  as  community  or  collective  arrangements,  different  than  the 
conventional individual (private) or state management of resources. 
 
I  would  like  however  to  focus  on  the  two  other  topics  left,  the  population  and  the  
  4 
distributional problems. Furthermore, I will present the proposition that the “population 
evil”  hypothesis  about  the  environment  only  becomes  important  and  valid  when  the 
asset inequality among the users of the commons is excessive, being the latter the real 
exogenous problem behind the degradation processes. 
 
Moreover, if  one  looks  at  the  social  and economic  processes currently  affecting the 
most ecologically valuable areas in the planet (e.g. tropical forests) such claim becomes 
of central relevance. Natural areas in developing countries are witnessing an increase in 
population  through  migration  and  colonization  while  the  agrarian  structure  of  these 
countries  and  regions remain unequal, particularly in the regions more  adequate for 
agriculture and exactly from all these migrants were expelled from by economic and 
political  forces.  However,  there  seems  to  be  more  research  and  policy  questioning 
about  the  population  increase  towards  tropical  forests  than  on  the  institutional 
environment that has created such problems. If the claim that inequality plays a central 
role on the degradation of the commons, especially under higher population pressures, 
then  redistributional  policies  should  be  part  of  the  agenda  about  defining  adequate 
institutions for managing the local and global commons. 
 
After  discussing  the  recent  contributions  of  the  literature  on  local  commons  I  will 
develop further the idea that cross-effects between key factors for collective action such 
as population density and asset inequality may create a different set of predictions than 
what usually is proposed from a marginal analysis of each alone. In particular, I make 
the  proposition  that  the  effect  of inequality  on  the  level  of  conservation  of  the  local 
commons is worse, the higher the level of population density in the village. Empirical 
econometric  evidence  from  a  set  of  160  small  villages  in  a  rural  Andean  region  in 
Colombia will study the cross-effect between population density and land distribution on 
the  environmental  externalities  derived  from  the  local  commons  in  the  village.  The 
results may suggest a possible interaction between village population density and group 
heterogeneity in the possibility of cooperation for maintaining village commons such like 
productive soils, erosion control, natural vegetation, or water regulation.  
 
The theoretical argument will be developed at two levels, one at the village level by 
looking at the effect of the village institutions in the choices by the group of farmers in 
technology and land use patterns and how these are affected by the level of population 
density  and  the  distribution  of  land.  At  a  micro  (farm)  level  I  will  also  discuss  the 
rationality of the farmer with respect to these decisions (technology and land use) and 
their relation with the conditions on inequality and population in the village. 
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1.  Population, Inequality and Cooperation for local commons conservation 
 
The fate of local commons such as remaining plots of forests or rural water resources 
has gone though an interesting variety of predictions from both theorists’ models and 
factual experiences observed by field researchers. At every other moment in time the 
literature  has  provided  some  new  specific variable to  explain  the  future  of a  certain 
renewable natural resource that presents the possibility of congestion, over exploitation 
or extinction. From the very beginning with Malthus’ predictions in the previous century 
until the recent works on game-theoretical models of local public goods and commons, 
certain factors have emerged as possible explanations to why a common pool of natural 
resources may be managed efficiently from a social view, or why it will be overexploited 
if  agents  behave  rationally.  Population  pressures, lack of  property  rights,  and  group 
size, heterogeneity and inequality are the most salient factors in this literature. However, 
most  analyses  either  from  the  theory  or  the  empirical  evidence  discuss  how  one 
particular factor -holding all others constant, define if the local commons’ fate is its over 
exploitation or a socially efficient management by its users. 
 
Population pressure has been probably the most old and recurrent factor claimed by 
authors  since  Malthus  (1798,  1830),  but  unfortunately  it  has  been  one  with  least 
innovative approaches
2, showing the still polarized views between the so called Neo-
Malthusians and what could be called the Boserupians
3 claiming that population growth 
may  in  fact  enhance  creativity  and  innovation  for  technological  shifts  to  respond  to 
scarcity and increasing demand for food. Notice, however, that  Malthusians and the 
environmental  Neo-Malthusians  base  their  argument  on  aggregate  variables  and 
consider  individuals  as  mere  consumers  of  resources  who  grow  exponentially  in 
numbers. No coordination among the individuals to overcome the possible pressures is 
assumed by these sides. 
 
Even more interesting is how those using the Malthus argument to blame population 
explosion  for  environmental  destruction  would  not  discuss  the  distributional  element 
(See  quotes  in  the  first  page)  that  Malthus  himself  mentions  along  his  essay  on 
population. 
 
But other factors have appeared over time additional to the ‘population evil’ hypothesis, 
attempting to predict the destiny of natural resources that are by nature indivisible, non-
rival  or  non-excludable.  The  1960' s  generated  a  great  set  of  economic  models  and 
predictions on this particular issue, bringing along public policy proposals for natural 
resource management and externalities control. Property rights has been the focus of 
                                                 
2 In his most recent book on economic growth and the environment, Herman Daly (1996) states how “It is 
frankly discouraging to see how little the population discussion has advanced during the last thirty years.” 
3 From the well known work by Esther Boserup (1965).  
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more  than  three  decades  since  Coase  (1960)  offered  a  bargaining  solution  to  the 
problem of externalities. His arguments created a wave of proposals for dealing with 
externalities derived from pollution and ecological public goods, reducing the solution to 
assigning  private  property  rights  in  the  natural  resources  that  had  been  under 
communal or public property. The great impact that Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” 
(1968)  had  over  this  debate  was  probably  supported  by  the  Coasian  view that  only 
individual (private) property rights could solve the externalities along with two important 
elements. One, the denial of a variety of other forms of property over natural resources 
such  as  communal  property  by  assuming that  the  lack  of  individual  private property 
rights meant open access to resources, and the proposition that state intervention most 
probably did not contribute but worsened the coordination problem. 
 
A great portion of the collective action literature argues further that an increase in the 
size of the group facing a commons dilemma will reduce the possibilities of cooperation 
by the members. However, the debate on the role of group heterogeneity and inequality 
in  particular  shows  more  contrasting  views.  What  this  paper  argues  is  that  these 
elements combined produce relationships that may contribute to such inconclusiveness. 
During the same years, Mancur Olson (1965) contributed to the debate with his “Logic 
of  Collective  Action”  by  calling  the  attention  that,  under  the  impossibility  to  totally 
exclude and divide the benefits of a collective good, economic agents may cooperate 
for the socially efficient provision of the public good in a decentralized way. Olson’s 
theoretical work generated a set of propositions and enough controversy to initiate a 
vast effort from both theoretical and empirical sides to test his predictions about the 
possibilities  that  collective  action  emerges,  contrary  to  the  free-riding  prediction  by 
conventional economics. Among the most important propositions laid by Olson where 
the negative effect of group size on the possibilities of collective action, and the more 
controversial one that group heterogeneity, inequality for instance, may increase the 
chances  that  collective  action  emerges.  These  arguments  generated  an  immense 
research effort to develop models and gather empirical evidence to support or contradict 
such propositions (See Sandler, 1992). 
 
The period after Olson’s contribution was characterized by a heated debate between 
the state and the market and private property rights as the only alternatives to solve the 
problems  derived  from  externalities.  The  case  of  the  environment  and  natural 
resources,  probably  because  of  the  1970s  social  and  ecological  movement  in  the 
industrialized  nations,  received  special  attention  and  a  vast  effort  favoring  state 
intervention,  mainly  through  command  and  control  measures  and  strengthening  the 
national government control over natural resources gave the state solution a boost. The 
possibilities  for  collective  action  and  community  management  of  natural  resources 
remained in the academic arena, and more attacked than blessed. 
 
However,  the  1980s  and  1990s  witnessed  a  reaction  to  the  predominant  views  by 
offering  the  evidence,  mainly  empirical  from  case  studies  world  wide,  that  Hardin’s  
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commons  were  not  necessarily  destined  to  tragic  over  exploitation,  when  collective 
institutions for managing common pool resources could design and enforce clear rules 
for excluding non group members and for controlling the members’ use of the resource 
(Ostrom, 1990; Berkes (ed), 1989). Furthermore, a revival of old themes and the rising 
new institutional economics bringing past topics such as inequality with new ones such 
as  information  asymmetry,  principal-agent  relations  and  game  theoretic  strategic 
behavior, opened the possibilities of expanding the debate further on the fate of local 
commons, and the actual potentials for state, market and community solutions. 
 
A large proportion of the economic literature has resisted the crude separation between 
efficiency  and  distribution  based  on  the  fundamental  theorems  of  welfare  in  the 
walrasian model. Such resistance has shown that when the economic problem presents 
problems of transaction costs in general (from which externalities and public goods are 
examples),  the  information  asymmetries  do  not  allow  for  pareto  efficient  solutions. 
When the conditions for costless transactions are not met and contracts can not be 
perfectly enforceable, agency problems emerge and sub-optimal solutions result. 
 
Such literature has found in the so called Coase theorem (1960) a challenge to the 
problem of solving these externalities. Coase suggested that if the affected parties could 
engage in costless bargaining, and the property rights to either the polluter or affected 
party were completely assigned, they would bargain over the optimal solution without 
need of a third party agent to enforce or correct the problem. Originally the Coasian 
solution would generate a pareto optimal outcome, but Farrell (1987) has proved that 
such is not the case; That although the parties could engage in bargaining over the 
externality, the outcome would not be pareto superior due to asymmetries. 
 
Inequality of wealth, income, information or access to certain resources in the economy 
has  been then  analyzed through the new ‘information economics’ paradigm (Stiglitz, 
1994)  using  different  approaches  and  models  reviving  old  but  unsolved  political 
economy  problems.  Bargaining  power,  principal-agency  problems,  game-theoretical 
models have been used for explaining how distribution may affect efficiency in a direct 
way (Bowles and Gintis, 1996; Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis, 1997). 
 
 
a.  Inequality and the environment 
 
In  the  particular  case  of  environmental  problems,  such  models  support  several 
arguments  where  poverty  and  inequality  may  worsen  pollution  and  natural  resource 
degradation outcomes beyond the conventional approach of the pigouvian social cost 
difference. 
 
The role of inequality, mainly wealth inequality expressed through land distribution, has 
appeared in the environmental debate. An important portion of the debate arises from  
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the  vicious cycle  of poverty and  degradation (Durning,  1989;  Leonard, 1985,  1989). 
Inequality  and  poverty  are  closely  related,  including  the  rural  setting,  where 
landlessness,  restricted  credit  markets  and  low  provision  of  public  services  are 
associated with unequal distribution of land. 
 
Boyce (1994) proposed a power-weighted model in which power differences between 
winners and losers from the economic activity causing the degradation will determine a 
different  “optimal  level  of  degradation”  depending  on  the  marginal  benefits  to  the 
winners and the marginal damages to the losers. Under such explanation, a positive 
relation  exists  between  power  (associated  with  wealth)  inequality  and  environmental 
degradation.  Further,  Torras  and  Boyce  (1996)  tested  empirically  some  of  these 
arguments  in  a  cross-section  analysis  introducing  non-linear  relations  between  per 
capita  income  and  emissions  of  several  major  pollutants.  Initially  the  conventional 
inverted “U” hypothesis was discussed where income and pollution would increase in a 
first stage and after a certain point the further income growth would compensate for the 
excessive damages and will bring down the emissions. They then tested a cubic form 
relationship  expanding  the  result  by  finding  that  eventually  an  even  higher  level  of 
income growth (e.g. OECD countries) will cause a rise again in pollutant emissions and 
concentrations. 
 
In a micro level analysis, Roemer (1994) has shown through a simple model how wealth 
inequality may increase such optimal level of pollution. His argument shows that the 
greater the share of an individual in the profits of the pollutant firm, the greater will be 
his optimal pollution (where marginal benefits from profits equate his marginal disutility 
from pollution), and therefore his comparatively higher power in the decision making of 
the firm will induce such higher levels of pollution.  
 
In a forthcoming volume (2005), Baland, Bardhan and Bowles compiled a set of papers 
where different mechanisms might be in effect, sometimes in opposite directions, on the 
relation between inequality and the environment. Policy biases, consumption effects, 
inadequate  provision  of  environmental  public  goods  in  poorer  societies,  and  social 
distances that impede solving in a self-governed manner the “tragedy of the commons” 
are  examples  of  processes  involved  in  explaining  how  inequality  can  affect 
environmental outcomes. 
 
This brings us to the problem of solving a local environmental problem when the group 
externality  is  generated  from  the  divergence  between  the  individual  and  group 
incentives . 
 
 
b.  Local commons problems. 
 
So far I have discussed some of the arguments where inequality may affect the level of  
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environmental degradation as an externality or public problem for one of the affected 
parties. However, there is a more complicated problem, traditionally labeled as either of 
the collective, commons, social, or prisoners’ dilemma. In this case, the non-cooperative 
rational  behavior  of  the  individuals  of  a  group  will  induce  a  socially  sub-optimal 
outcome, despite them knowing that a coordinated effort would bring the entire group to 
a socially superior solution. Figure 1 illustrates such situation through a typical model 
where  aggregate  flow  of  benefits  from  the  commons  is  a  concave  function  of  the 
aggregate effort to extract such benefits
4. It usually assumed from biological conditions 
that after a certain peak, the limited renewability of the natural resource cannot maintain 
its biological productivity and too much effort extracting products or services from it will 
reduce considerably its flow of benefits for the users group. 
eoa eopt Aggregate effort
(pressure)
social
optimal:
MB=MC
Open access :
AB=AC
Aggragate benefits
from the commons
 
Figure 1. Flow of aggregate ecological benefits from the local commons as a function of 
aggregate effort (pressure). 
                                                 
4 In the case of fisheries, total catch is a concave function on the total number of boats (or nets) put in the 
water for fishing. In the case of a forest, one could think of an aggregate flow of biomass appropriated by 
the village for energy, fodder, food, which is a function of the aggregate village effort, say, in total number 
of hours devoted to extract such biomass.  
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Figure  1  pictures  such  situation.  Assuming  increasing  costs  on  effort,  two  extreme 
solutions  can  illustrate  the  “commons  dilemma”.  On  the  one  hand,  the  social 
maximization of aggregate net benefits will control aggregate effort at eopt, by equalizing 
marginal benefits with marginal costs. In the other extreme there is the “open access” 
case where the non-cooperative actions by each individual user of the resources pool 
will find it still rational to add one unit to effort and extract additional benefits from the 
commons,  up  to  the  point  where  for  each  individual  agent  average  benefits  equal 
average costs. Obviously such solution will create too much aggregate effort (eoa) and 
eventually too little aggregate benefits because the ecosystem is over exploited. 
 
Although still useful for the discussion, both extremes have proved to be unrealistic. The 
open access outcome predicts that individual behavior will exhaust a resource because 
it assumes there  are  no social forces,  norms or institutions (formal or informal) that 
protect  the  collective  interest,  at  least  partially.  The  social  optimal  solution,  even  if 
defended only through the private solution of assigning all property rights and residual 
claimancy  on  one  authority  is  also  unrealistic  because  the  transaction  costs  and 
enforceability  of  such property  rights  will limit the  possibilities to  fully  internalize the 
externalities. 
 
In the environmental discourse the popular “Tragedy of the Commons” by Garret Hardin 
(1968) popularized this view through a situation where the users of an open access 
renewable natural resource would end up exhausting it due to their individual rationality. 
However the Hardin’s situation was characterized by rather extreme conditions, namely 
that the users would not engage in any coordination actions to overcome the problem, 
and that the property rights were basically non existent over the resource. Most local 
commons problems, however, involve a certain level of exclusion for non-members of 
the group, and property rights are at least partially enforced. Cornes and Sandler (1983; 
1986)  and  Cornes,  Mason  and  Sandler  (1986)  have  proved,  however,  that  Hardin’s 
tragedy  will  not  result  from  his  original  prediction,  yet,  the  over  extraction  of  the 
commons will happen. In their model they show that an optimal number of firms or users 
will result, beyond which is not rational to assume the costs of extraction and benefit 
from  the  open  access  resource.  Thus,  exhaustion  may  not  happen  as  predicted. 
However, these models mentioned, again, ignore the possibility of coordination of the 
local commons users to solve the dilemma. 
 
Thus,  our  focus  of  interest  in  this  paper  is  to  study  how  inequality  and  population 
pressures may drive the level of aggregate effort and productivity from the commons 
closer to either the social optimum or the “open access” solutions. 
 
 
 
  
  11 
c.  Inequality and local commons. 
 
The  recent  developments  on  the  possibility  that  groups  using  a  common  pool  of 
resources may engage in collective actions to solve the coordination failure, has found 
in  the  group  heterogeneity  issue  a  source  of  thought  for  studying  the  problem  of 
inequality among the members of the group. One starting point of such discussion is 
Olson’s claim that group heterogeneity will increase the likelihood that collective action 
emerges.  In  the  Olson’s  explanation,  the  argument  is  based  on  that  in  a  privileged 
group  the  wealthier  members  who  comparatively  have  more  interests  in  the  public 
goods from cooperation, will contribute more to its provision, and the less privileged will 
then be able to benefit from such cooperation. 
 
However, there are contrasting views suggesting that asset inequality could diminish, 
rather than enhance, the  provision of the public good by the individual contributions of 
the members of the group (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 1996; Baland and Platteau, 
1996; 1997; Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis, 1997). 
 
Their response, in general, to the Olsonian prescription, is that the net effect of the 
privileged group in the final local commons outcome depends on several other factors, 
and that it may not be necessarily positive. Dayton-Johnosn and Bardhan, for instance, 
raise the possibility that rich members may exit the group  attempting to provide the 
public good rather than cooperate or free-ride on the provision by others. Baland and 
Platteau, on the other hand, argue that although the wealthier users may indeed have a 
greater incentive to cooperate, other issues involved in the problem may affect the net 
result.  Not  all  the  situations  may  be  better  expressed  as  PD  games,  they  claim. 
Imperfect information and different forms of social regulation may change the rules of 
the game generating other types of results. 
 
Bowles  and  Gintis  (1996), and  Bardhan,  Bowles  and  Gintis  (1997)  argue  that  asset 
inequality undermines efficiency-enhancement possibilities because of the asymmetries 
and the costly enforceability of the contracts between the agents sharing the externality, 
being in this case a public good ecological externality among the local commons users. 
Furthermore, and as in the case of Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, these works claim 
that different types of inequalities (e.g. assets, exit options, power to enforce, fallback 
position)  generate  different  effects  on  the  equilibrium  result,  and  therefore  different 
types of redistribution will be more effective than others in the social outcome, being in 
this case the achievement or failure on preserving the local commons resources
5. 
                                                 
5 The rural inequality and poverty questions are then somehow relative. In a methodologically interesting 
paper  in  World  Development,  Reardon  and  Vosti  (1995)  (“Links  between  rural  poverty  and  the 
environment  in  developing  countries:  Asset  categories  and  investment  poverty”)  argue  that  there  are 
several types or components of asset poverty in rural contexts, and each of them may have a different 
relation  with  possible  environmental  outcomes.  Rural  poverty  could  be  in  terms  of  natural  resources  
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More  recently,  Cardenas  (2003)  and  Cardenas  et.al.  (2002)  explored  using 
experimental methods how heterogeneity among group members may have an effect in 
this endogenous solution to the collective action dilemma of an environmental problem 
at  the  group  level.  On  the  one  hand  these  experiments  found  that  social  distance 
among  players  restrict  the  capacity  to  trust  others  in  the  group,  being  trust  and 
reciprocity key engines of cooperation. On the other, when asymmetries exist among 
the  group  members,  and  contrary  to  the  Bersgtrom,  Blume  and  Varian  (1986) 
prediction, we found, similarly to Chan et.al (1996, 1999), that those with poorer private 
options and whose income is more dependent on collective actions with others, were 
more likely to cooperate or provide the public good. 
 
Baland and Platteau (1997) suggest a model to explain the collective action problem 
that a group of farmers may face when dealing with soil erosion control practices (e.g. 
anti-erosive  barriers
6).  Typically, an isolated  contribution by investing in a  barrier on 
one’s farm will not contribute to increase the state of the local commons (soil quality), 
unless a sufficiently large number of farmers in the village undertake such investment. 
Their  results  show  that  different  Nash  equilibria  emerge  depending  on  several 
assumptions in the model. A first result shows that the individual’s incentive in investing 
in the local commons is an increasing function of the  number of cooperators in the 
village. On the possible equilibria resulting from the model there is the tragedy of the 
commons  outcome  where  non  cooperation  is  a  Nash  equilibrium,  yielding  a  pareto 
inferior result although the collective result of cooperation is pareto superior as in any 
PD  game.  However,  the  opposite  extreme  of  the  spectrum  shows  that  when  the 
individual  investment  cost  is  low  enough,  or  the  expected  benefits  from  such 
cooperation are large enough for the smallest of the farmers, there will be sufficient 
incentives  for  individual  (non-cooperative)  cooperation  and  therefore  individual  and 
collective  efficient  outcomes  result  from  all  individuals  building  the  erosion  control 
barriers. The possible outcomes in between these extremes, coordination failures as 
they label them, will present different equilibria situations with respect to the incentives 
required  for  individuals  to  cooperate  depending  on  several  factors  modeled.  Of 
particular interest for our discussion is the case where non-identical agents interact in 
the village. Their model shows that the net effect of land inequality in the incentives for 
landowners to invest will be the result of two effects working on opposite directions. The 
large  landowners  will  have  an  extra  incentive  in  conservation  measures  given  their 
larger stake in the village local commons. However, such inequality also reduces the 
incentives by the smaller landholders who see their incentives to cooperate reduced. 
The result is then inconclusive, and therefore they argue that policy interventions in the 
agrarian structure would not have a definite effect on the incentives for village members 
                                                                                                                                                             
assets, human resources poverty, on-farm, and off-farm assets (physical and financial). 
6  Other  types  of  local  commons  are  mentioned  in  the  paper  such  as  watershed  management,  wind 
erosion control, water erosion control, fishery management, forestry management, and weed and pest 
control management. All of these involve a typical collective action dilemma situation at the village level.  
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to contribute to the conservation of local commons. 
 
Baland  and  Platteau  (1997)  discuss  the  effect  of  population  on  the  possibility  of 
cooperation by community members. Compatible with the Neo-malthusian argument, 
their  model  shows  that  as  the  number  of  landowners  increase  in  the  village,  the 
individual incentives to invest in the local commons are reduced. The argument they 
use is that the endowment by each farmer is reduced with the increased number of 
holdings,  reducing  the  expected  gains  from  the  local  commons,  and  therefore  the 
equilibrium moves from the extreme of unconditional cooperation by all members to the 
extreme  of  the  tragedy  of  the  commons  outcome  (page  206).  In  other  words,  an 
increase  in  the  size  of  the  village  population  is  interpreted  solely  as  a  reduction  of 
available per-capita land which in turn increases the pressure over the local commons.  
 
However, this and other similar arguments under the “population evil” environmental 
argument, do not account for other processes involved in population sizes at village 
levels. Most of these views assume only the ‘demand’ side of the village population 
size, i.e. the indisputable fact that greater populations demand more aggregate volumes 
of matter and energy from their surrounding ecosystems for food, fiber, firewood, inputs 
and other. However, there is a ‘positive’ side to the problem, the possibility that larger 
groups  of  people  can  engage  also  in  actions  that  reduce  the  negative  effects  of 
extracting  matter  and  energy  from  the  local  commons.  A  partial  or  total  equilibrium 
model of the village may look at the substitution effects between labor and capital in the 
farms village and how this has an effect, for instance, in the amount of soil or water 
contamination caused by manual weeding vs. pesticides use. Moreover, one can argue, 
for instance, that dense villages may have associated greater frequency of interactions 
among  the  village  members  rather  than  unpopulated  ones.  Therefore,  eventually  a 
positive relation between village population and frequency of interactions could increase 
the possibility of reciprocal behavior that usually results on choosing nice tit-for-tat as 
Nash  strategy  in  repeated  games,  increasing  the  possibilities  of  cooperation  for 
preserving the village local commons. 
 
I shall discuss these issues in more detail when I introduce the theoretical discussion 
and empirical evidence that there might be some cross-effects between population side 
and  land  inequality  that  could  improve  and  expand  the  results  emerging  from  this 
literature. 
 
Before  doing  that,  however,  it  will  be  very  useful  for  my  argument  to  mention  the 
important  contribution  that  empirical  work  can  make  for  the  discussion.  Although  it 
seems widely accepted now that the conventional prediction of an unconditional free 
riding  outcome  resulting  from  public  goods  or  commons  type  of  problems  is  very 
unlikely  in  the  actual  world,  the  levels  of  non-free-riding  and  the  conditions  for 
individuals not to behave as such, are still under debate. 
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d.  Field and experimental evidence on cooperation, commons and 
collective action. 
 
The observation of the behavior of people facing coordination failures in the real world 
has been made through two major strategies by economics and other social sciences. 
Field work usually through closer but descriptive and qualitative analysis of case studies 
on certain villages, or local commons situations; and economic experiments run in more 
controlled settings. Both of these have backed in a great deal the argument against the 
(homo-economicus) free-riding model. Some of the most important contributions from 
these empirical works can be briefly mentioned. 
 
Ostrom  (1990)  and  Berkes  (1987)  have  been  extensively  cited  for  their  collected 
evidence  on  several  contemporary  cases  where  communal  management  of  natural 
resources  has  succeeded  despite  severe  constraints  from  the  nature  of  the  local 
commons, constraints from the definitions and enforcement of rules by the user groups, 
or constraints from external conditions threatening a communal arrangement. 
 
Another two widely known and cited works are Wade’s “village republics” study in India 
(1988), and Putnam’s (1993) study of the institutional performance on different Italian 
regions.  Putnam’s  concept  of  Social  Capital  has  expanded  the  possibilities  of 
considering nonmaterial or intangible forms of productive capital in local levels, which 
plays important roles in the provision of public goods at local levels. These works have 
also  opened  the  door  to  introducing  the  issue  of  community  participation  and 
involvement  in  the  economic  analysis  of  the  provision  of  public  goods  which  is 
extensively ignored by the fiscal and public policy literature, particularly on local public 
goods despite the empirical evidence showing the link between community involvement 
and the outcomes in terms of coverage and quality of the services. 
 
The  other important  source  of empirical evidence that  strengthen  the  arguments  for 
people  being  able  to  overcome  Prisoners’  Dilemma  situations  is  the  vast  work  with 
experimental economics, particularly public goods experiments, aimed at identifying the 
individual behavior of agents when facing coordination failure situations. 
 
Ostrom,  Walker  and  Gardner  (1994)  have  compiled  several  years  of  empirical  and 
experimental  work  on  common  pool  resources  and  provide  some  suggestive 
conclusions about the conditions under which groups will be able to self-regulate in the 
use of a common-pool without over harvesting it. Among the most relevant results from 
this work is the enhanced role of communication among group members prior to the 
individual  decisions,  and  beyond  the  ‘cheap  talk’  assumption
7  (Ostrom,  1997).  
                                                 
7 Ostrom (1997) mentions  a “...meta-analysis of over 100 experiments involving over 5,000 subjects, 
[where]  opportunities  for  face-to-face  communication  in  one-shot  experiments  significantly  raises  the  
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“Exchanging mutual commitment, increasing trust, creating and re-enforcing norms, and 
developing  a  group  identity  appear  to  be  the  most  important  processes  that  make 
communication efficacious”. 
 
Other forms identified in these studies as explanatory of the capabilities of common-
pool self-governed by groups are the innovation in the creation of a variety of norms and 
rules,  and  the  use  of  resources  for  monitoring,  punishing  and  rewarding  individual 
behavior. Reciprocity norms, which appear to be central from the experimental evidence 
worldwide,  are  strong  factors  in  determining  the  behavior  of  group  members  when 
facing a collective action dilemma. 
 
In a recent work, Moir (1997) has taken from Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) to 
deepen into the issue of monitoring and sanctioning in common-pool resources. Within 
the  same  common-pool  model,  he  compares  the  baseline  model  where  no 
communication is allowed and a typical commons problem exists, with two alternatives, 
one, that group members may monitor the behavior of the others, and another, where 
members can sanction the non-optimal behavior of others. The main results suggest 
that  monitoring  alone  may  not  help  correct  the  coordination  failure  by  reducing  the 
aggregate  level  of  extraction  from  the  common-pool  or  by  increasing  the  efficiency 
gains, but sanctioning involving the actual enforcement of rules is in fact effective in 
controlling extraction levels and increasing efficiency. 
 
 
e.  Emerging and contrasting elements: Population pressure, group 
inequality and group composition. 
 
Bardhan  (1993a,  1993b)  discusses  how  the  characteristics  within  the  group  have 
different effects on the possibility that local commons be wisely managed over time by 
rural communities, and the emerging evidence from experiments, the field and theory 
about cooperation or over-use of the local commons. I presented before an important 
portion of the literature on how inequality can affect the possibilities that communities, 
particularly rural, engage in collective actions to manage their local commons. Wealth or 
asset inequality makes part of the broader concept of group heterogeneity, which Olson 
(1965)  has  argued  to  increase  the  chances  for  collective  action  when  the  more 
privileged members of the group may have an additional incentive to invest in the local 
commons  even  of  such  action  may  generate  positive  externalities  to  the  poorer 
members  of  the  group.  The  contrasting  literature  on  productivity  enhancing 
redistributions has argued,  however, that inequality can undermine such possibilities 
because of the nature of the possible contracts within the groups which includes costly 
enforcement and non-observability of some of the key variables. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
cooperation rate, on average, by more than 45 percentage points.”  
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There is however a third element in which both the Olsonian view through the concept 
of group size, and the game-theoretical approaches such as Baland and Platteau with 
the  number  of  land  owners,    could  agree  on  its  effect  on  collective  action.  Most 
approaches have been arguing that an increase in population and therefore an increase 
in the number of members of the community would undermine the chances of collective 
action.  The  population  issue  in  the  collective  action  problem  is  therefore  one  more 
variable in the even broader concept of group composition
8. Inequality within the group 
and the size of the group, relative to the resources available to them, make part of the 
group composition.  As I will argue later, the interaction of population and inequality 
factors  in  the  group  composition  may  have  different  effects  on  the  potentials  for 
cooperation from within the group members.  
One  clarification  should  be  made  at  this  point.  Although  related,  group  size  and 
population pressures are by definition different concepts. While a large portion of the 
collective action literature on the commons focuses on the limits that group size impose 
in creating conditions for voluntary cooperation by members, I would rather focus on the 
problem of population pressure
9. 
 
It is important at this point to highlight that most of the models have a micro level of 
analysis  and  the  incentives  for  conserving  or  overexploiting  the  local  commons  are 
looked at from the perspective of each individual household in the village. Although the 
recent literature has  made  a great step  by introducing the strategic behavior by the 
individual and therefore be able to model the prisoners’ dilemma situation in a more 
realistic manner, the net result on the superior level, the village, is still inconclusive from 
micro models as Baland and Platteau (1997) argue when closing their paper. The effect 
of individual actions on a village local commons is looked from the perspective of each 
of  the  village  members  but  not  on  the  net  effect  of  the  aggregate  of  the  village 
members.  The  same  argument  would  apply to  the  case  of Roemer’s  model  (1994). 
Although the willingness to control the public bad (erosion) by the landowner is reduced 
by his share in the sharecropping contract, one could not derive the conclusion that 
villages  that  have  sharecropping  contracts  giving  greater  shares  to  landowners  will 
necessarily have higher levels of “equilibrium erosion”. 
 
Other factors that are played at the village level (group effects) may intervene also in 
the  landowner’s  contribution  to  the  conservation  of  the  local  commons  and  are  not 
necessarily captured in these models. In the case of heterogeneous groups with asset 
                                                 
8 Sandler (1992) has suggested that future research on the role of group composition in collective action; 
Dasgupta and Itaya (1991) cited by Sandler, and Schwab and Oates (1991) have provided some first 
steps in such modeling when community members are heterogeneous. 
9 Sam Bowles (personal communication) provides a useful separation by suggesting that while population 
density reflects the degree of the environmental challenge, group size relates to the political challenge for 
collective action.  
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inequality, for instance, one could not look at the net impact of the positive and negative 
effects at the village level in the local commons, because the winners and losers of 
inequality will have different incentives in conservation measures, and the net effect on 
the village local commons will be the aggregation of the effects of the actions by each 
type, and the number of members on each group in the village. 
 
Thus, the final effect of the actions by the members of a group in the conservation or 
degradation  of  the  village  local  commons  could  not  be  entirely  looked  from  the 
standpoint  of  one  member’s  optimization  problem  if  one  does  not  look  at  the 
aggregation of the net effects by the different sub-groups in the community, particularly 
if  group  heterogeneity  is  higher.  The  net  effect  of  individuals’  actions  in  the  local 
commons is a village (meso-economics?) problem. Therefore, the specific condition of a 
local commons is the result of both the individual rationality of the members, which in 
part depends on their strategic behavior with respect to the rest of the group members, 
but it is also the result of the aggregation of the effects from each of the sub-groups that 
compose the heterogeneity of the village. 
 
The question then is whether the conservation of the village commons is the result of 
autonomous individuals’ cooperation (non-cooperative), or the result of stronger village 
effects (e.g. social norms), or the unintended effect of the sum of benefits and costs 
imposed  by  each  of  the  subgroups  whose  decisions  affect  its  conservation.  This 
question I do not pretend to respond, but it seems that both processes play an important 
role,  and  probably  a  complementary  one.  Villages  where  individual’s  preferences 
involve certain type of cooperative or communal traits may find it easier to maintain 
group norms that are beneficial to the conservation of the local commons. Such norms, 
however, would find it better to survive in villages where individuals’ utilities involve only 
selfish elements. 
 
The recent empirical study by Sampson et.al. (1997) on the Chicago neighborhoods 
would  be  compatible  with  such  argument  in  the  sense  that  both  individual  and 
neighborhood level factors determine the public goods outcomes, being in that case the 
neighborhood public safety. In their study, social norms and social capital, along with 
individual socio-economic conditions, explain the levels of cooperation by the individuals 
in self-governing some of the local related violence. 
 
A key element of the discussion that remains to be clarified is the causality of these 
individual and group factors. At a first glance it seems that some vicious or virtuous 
cycles  may  arise  between  individuals’  preferences  and  community  social  norms. 
However it does not explain the direction that the system would take if one of the factors 
is changed. It seems that an evolutionary theory may contribute in this area by studying, 
for  instance,  if  a  more  individualistic  strategy  of  free-riding  on  a  local  commons 
attempted to invade a community with strong village values regarding the conservation 
of their watershed or forests.  
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Finally, it is important to highlight that most of the models studying the incentives for 
collective action from the individual perspective need for tractability purposes to assume 
certain variables to be exogenous to the individual’s choices. In the case of agriculture, 
for instance, technology expressed in terms of land use patterns (crops, pastures or 
forests)  or  in  terms  of  production  relative  inputs  is  generally  assumed  as  constant. 
However,  field  observation  of  rural  villages  shows  how  decision  making  at  the 
household level regarding both the portion of the land for different land uses and inputs 
use greatly changes across time and villages and in many cases as response to several 
exogenous changes in prices, climate or other social conditions. The empirical evidence 
presented later shows such a case, and further, it explains an important portion of the 
status of each local commons in each village
10. 
 
 
2.  Farm and Village Models: Why there might be some cross-effects between 
population density and group heterogeneity in the village 
 
The argument will be presented initially by the discussion of theoretical elements from 
prior models, and then supported empirical evidence. To develop this hypothesis I will 
use the case of a rural village that shares certain local commons resources expressed 
through the status of forest, soil and water resources combined. Group heterogeneity 
will be associated to the distribution of land, and population density to the number of 
households in the village, relative to land available. 
 
The  basic  notion  of  the  cross-effects  developed  here  is  that  the  marginal  effect  of 
population density on the conservation of local commons is determined by the group 
heterogeneity,  or  conversely,  the  relation  between  group  heterogeneity  and 
conservation of the local commons is mediated  by the size  of the population in the 
village, relative to the quality of land. In particular I propose that villages with more equal 
access to land should make the population pressure effect have a lower association 
with the degradation of the local commons. 
 
In order to develop the argument I shall start at the farm level by looking at the decision 
making by any farmer in the village who has access to the local commons. Then I will 
look at the village level and discuss some implications of the farm-level results. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Water, soil and forest resources are directly affected by the farming system decision by the household. 
The relative shares of land devoted to pastures, crops or natural vegetation, as well as the use of certain 
inputs and byproducts from agriculture and livestock have severe on-farm and off-farm impacts in the 
village.  
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Figure 2. Optimal allocation of time between the commons and own land. 
 
 
a.  The farm-level decision making
11. 
 
For the analysis  to  follow,  and for  purposes  of simplicity I  will  assume  the  baseline 
scenario where the commons or common-pool resource level of excludability and rivalry 
reflects  the  case  for  an  open  access  resource  rather  than  a  community-managed 
resource, closer to the (OA) solution in Figure1, i.e. at zero rents. However, a more 
realistic analysis should be aware of institutional forms of regulation where farmers can 
be restrained from the open access solution and allow for coordinating the community’s 
aggregate effort to manage the resource. 
 
Assume an average farmer for whom the production function depends on his own land 
(t, fixed
12) and available labor time (L). Let us assume further that Q = Q(t, L) where Qt, 
QL > 0, and QtL > 0. Thus, when looking at the time allocation problem (see figure 2), 
the farmer will allocate his time at L
* where the marginal product of labor in his own land 
                                                 
11 See Weitzmann (1974) and Baland and Platteau (1996). 
12 The inverse of population density (p) defined as number of households divided by the total village land 
is precisely t = 1/p.  
AP  L 
Q  L  (t,L) 
L 
*  Time allocated for  
working own land 
Time allocated for using the commons  0  L 
Average product of labor in the commons  
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QL = APL , where APL is the average product of labor on the commons. The remaining 
amount  of  time  (L  -  L
*)  will  be  allocated  to  effort  into  extracting  benefits  from  the 
commons. Notice that the larger private land will shift the QL(t,L) curve to the right (up), 
or conversely, as the farmer owns less land, its optimal allocation of time will induce him 
to increase its effort in extracting benefits from the commons. Notice also that a farmer 
may have enough land that it is not necessary for her to allocate time into the commons, 
that is when the marginal product of labor curve is high (to the right) enough that she 
will allocate all her time into her own land. 
 
An increase in population in the village, with fixed total land, will decrease the average 
per household land and therefore reduce average t, shifting QL(t,L) to the left. This will 
add to the aggregate effort (e) in using the commons and therefore will decrease its 
aggregate flow of benefits. Such situation will reduce the average product for users due 
to  overcrowding  of  the  resource,  shifting  APL  downwards.  Thus,  a  reduction  in  per 
household farm size will create a net increase in the aggregate effort by farmers using 
the commons since the shift of AP would not overpower the shift in MP. The reason for 
this is that at optimality AP is flat (at maximum) and MP is decreasing, ∂MP/∂L > ∂AP/∂L 
(Henderson and Quandt, 1980: 68). 
 
Let us think now on the effects of a change in the land distribution in a village. Assume 
the case of two farmers who initially own the same amount of land (T/2) of total village’s 
land (T) and which will be sufficient for them to allocate all their time in the own land (L
* 
=  L),  i.e.  they  would  not  need  to  use  the  commons.  Assume  then  that  after  a 
redistribution of land, one of the farmers ends up with 3/4of the land leaving the other 
with 1/4. While the average land per household remains constant at 1/2, the aggregate 
use of the commons changes because now the smaller farmer (with t=1/4) will allocate 
part of her time in the commons which is shown by a shift of QL(t,L) to the left.  
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Figure 3. Changes in commons use from a change in distribution of land. 
 
 
The basic notion that inequality increases the negative diseconomies created by larger 
use of the commons is compatible with other works earlier discussed such as Boyce 
(1994),  Roemer  (1994),  Bardhan,  Bowles  and  Gintis  (1997),  Dayton-Johnson  and 
Bardhan (1996), Baland and Platteau (1996, 1997). 
 
 
b.  The village-level effects. 
 
The  results  above  lead  us  to  an  expression  of  the  village  commons’  production  of 
environmental goods and services (B) as a function of the actions taken by the farmers 
in both their own land and the open access commons, and the institutions in the village. 
The individual farmers’ actions affect B in several ways, for instance, through their direct 
effort in extracting from the commons (C) biomass (firewood, logging, food, fodder, etc) 
and water, among others. On the other hand, the farmers’ actions in their own land 
affect  the  local  commons  water  and  soils,  for  instance,  by  increasing  their  use  of 
fertilizer and pesticides, or by causing soil erosion through intensive crops and livestock 
land  uses  (P).  Meanwhile,  institutional  parameters  such  as  inequality  will  determine 
those technological choices through relative input prices and access to land. 
 
For simplification purposes let us define B as   
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1.  B = B[C(g,t), P(w)], where BC < 0, BP < 0
13, where 
 
C(g,t),  is  the  village  aggregate  level  of  effort  put  into  extracting  from  the 
commons, which is a decreasing function of t, the mean farm size in the village 
as  discussed  earlier,  (Ct<0),  and  an  increasing  function  of  g,  the  level  of 
inequality (Cg > 0) as discussed in Figure 3.; 
 
P(w), the village’s area in pastures as land use, which is increasing in wage (Pw 
>0) based on the assumption that as labor becomes more expensive, farmers 
should shift from land uses like crops to less labor intensive land uses such as 
livestock
14.  
 
If  one  assumes  that  the  village’s  wage  w  depends  in  the  village  population  density 
(p=1/t) and the village’s distribution of assets, w = w(g,t), with wg < 0 and wt > 0, then we 
have, 
 
2.   B = B[C(g,t), P(w(g,t))]. 
 
The next step in the analysis is to introduce a change in population level in the village 
and see how that affects the flow of benefits from the commons. Thus, 
 
 
3.  ∂B/∂t  =   BC ￿Ct  + BP ￿ Pw ￿ wt 
    =  (-) (-) + (-)  (+)  (+) # ? $￿ 0  
 
From  which  no  unique  sign  can  be  derived.  The  reason  for  this  result  is  that  two 
opposing effects (BC￿Ct and BP￿Pw￿wt) are interacting when the average per family farm 
size t (inverse of population density) changes. According to (3), as the average farm 
size  increases  (from  a  population  density reduction) less effort  is  put  into  using the 
commons; but on the other hand, it increases the village’s wages inducing farmers to 
switch to less labor intensive but more damaging activities such as soil erosive livestock 
and capital (chemical) intensive crops which generate damages to the local commons. 
 
Let us then look at the cases where ∂B/∂t might be positive and negative respectively. 
                                                 
13  The  marginal  effects  BC  and  BP  can  be  thought  as  marginal  damages  to  the  ecosystem  from  an 
additional unit of resource extraction and an additional unit in pastures expansion respectively. 
14 For analytical purposes one should assume that the function P(w) is increasing and convex on w, 
therefore reflecting the notion that for a certain portion of wages increases the level of pastures land use 
by farmers should not change by much and farmers mostly use crops as the main land use given the high 
labor supply an demand for staple crops. However, after a certain point the curve a change in wage will 
create a much larger effect in land uses inducing a major switch from crops to pastures, after which the 
function P(w) becomes now concave, yielding therefore an S-shaped function.  
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When ∂B/∂t  > 0 the Neo-malthusian argument prevails, i.e. that when the average per 
household  farm  size  increases  (that  is,  when  the  population  density  decreases)  the 
pressure over the environment should be reduced. In our model, that would happen 
when  BC  Ct  >  BP  Pw  wt.  Likewise,  having  ∂B/∂t    <  0  (that  when  population  density 
increases a net positive effect over the local commons results) would be consistent with 
the  Boserupian  argument  that  an  increase  in  population  may  induce  technological 
changes and adaptation to the constraining conditions. In such case BC Ct < BP Pw wt. 
 
In order to study the conditions under which each possibility may emerge, we introduce 
the inequality effect, g, which will decide the net effect. The basic intuition is that at high 
inequality levels the indirect effects from farming practices into the commons (BP Pw wt) 
get overpowered by the population pressure effect (BC Ct). The reason for this is that at 
high  inequality,  as  we  proved  before,  the  landless  and  near-landless  farmers  will 
increase their labor allocated into the commons (Figure 3), while the change into more 
sustainable  farming  practices  from  lower  wages  by  fewer  landholders  will  not 
compensate for the damages created by the overuse of the commons. 
 
For equation (3) to be negative, that is, that a population density increase does not 
reduce but increase the flow of benefits from the commons we need that BCCt < BPPw 
wt. This result holds for cases where the distribution of land is equal enough that C(g,t) 
is very small, which we proved before for the case where farmers would allocate most of 
their labor into their own land. In such case, an increase in the population density, by 
increasing the supply of  labor,  would  induce a  shift by farmers  to  more  sustainable 
(labor  intensive)  practices  usually  associated  with  labor  intensive  activities  such  as 
manual weeding, crop rotation, and reduction in chemical intensive inputs use such as 
fertilization and pesticides. 
 
Graphically, the argument can be presented through the following figure (4) where the 
slope of the relation between the average farm size (inverse of population density) and 
the aggregate (village) effort for using the commons is steeper for the cases where the 
inequality  is  higher.  Thus,  a  reduction  in  the  average  farm  size  from  a  population 
increase  will  have  a  stronger  effect  on  the  aggregate  level  of  extraction  from  the 
commons  when  the  village  distribution  of  land  is  more  unequal,  or  conversely,  a 
worsening  in  the  distribution  of  land  will  have  a  more  damaging  effect  when  the 
population density is higher (segment ab), i.e. at a village’s lower average farm size 
than at less population pressure (segment cd). 
 
Summarizing the results, the following table shows the two possible outcomes for the 
sign of ∂B/∂t depending on the level of inequality and the prevailing or dominant effect in 
each  case.  The  next  step  should  be  to  test  these  hypotheses  econometrically  and 
discuss the implications in the next section.  
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Figure 4. Average farm size and level of pressure into the commons. 
 
 
 
Basic equation: B = B[C(g,t), P(w(g,t))] 
Low Inequality (g)  High Inequality (g)  Increase  in 
population  density 
(decrease  in  t, 
t=Pop.Density
-1) 
∂B/∂t < 0  ∂B/∂t > 0 
BC Ct < BP Pw wt  BC Ct > BP Pw wt  Dominant effect 
Shift  to  sustainable  farming 
practices  and  land  uses  from 
higher use of labor. 
Increase  in  the  aggregate 
use of the commons  
Table 1. Cross-effects of inequality and average farm size (population density
-1) 
 
Average farm size in the 
village (t=1/Pop.Density) 
Low GINI 
scenario 
High GINI 
scenario 
a 
b 
d 
c 
Average Farm Size 
N  1 
N  2 
N  3 
N  4  
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3.  Empirical evidence of the cross-effects of inequality and population density 
in the Andes. 
 
A first observation of the variability across villages within a rural region in Colombia will 
yield  some  first ideas  of how the variables involved  at  household  and village  levels 
interact  and  affect  the  village  commons
15.  Why  a  region  with  similar  bioregional 
characteristics,  ecological  carrying  capacity,  common  historical  process  and 
macroeconomic  policies  and  constraints,  and  relatively  homogeneous  ethnic 
background,  may  present  across  villages  a  high  variability  in  environmental 
degradation, farming systems, population density and land distribution? This is the case 
-and not an exception- of a rural Andean region in Colombia, the Chicamocha region, 
consisting  of  17  municipalities  and  around  160  veredas  (villages)  for  which  a 
comprehensive  ecological  and  socio-economic  study  was  undertaken  between  1990 
and 1994 (Baptiste et.al., 1993; IDEADE, 1995; Cardenas, 1994). 
 
Several  explanations  for  having  different  levels  of  environmental  degradation  across 
villages could emerge from several sides of the environmental discussion. Many may 
argue that the higher population density creates pressure over the ecosystems, usually 
within  the  Neo-Malthusian  argument.  As  I  will  later  show,  there  is  not  a  monotonic 
negative relation between these variables for the region studied, and consistent with the 
model developed earlier.  Others  would claim that the change in technology towards 
more “green revolution” farming systems creates greater degradation, which, however, 
does not explain entirely the results for this region. Some could even offer an ecological 
explanation through the carrying capacity of the specific ecosystems. However, different 
environmental outcomes coexist for ecologically similar areas. 
 
At  the  village  level,  the  following  villages  (See  Table)  show  the  variability  of 
technological, institutional and environmental outcomes. A comparison of how land use 
patterns (PCROPS, PPAST) vary along with the population density (POPDEADJ) and 
the distribution of land (GINIADJ) may explain the adoption of more or less sustainable 
practices  (SPRINDX)  The  dominant  farming  systems  are  also  dissimilar.  Notice  for 
instance the cases of  CUCO and DIMISA, two villages within the same municipality. 
With opposite situations with respect to population density and distribution of land, the 
quality  of  their  commons  varies  considerably,  and  it  is  related  to  the  technological 
choices in farming systems and land use patterns. The econometric evidence to be 
presented  later  on  will  clarify  such  relations  with  stronger  and  more  comprehensive 
evidence. 
 
                                                 
15  This  in  fact,  the  personal  experience  of  the  author  visiting  several  of  the  villages  in  this  region, 
originated  the  ideas  behind  this  research.  The  ecological  diversity  found  in  the  tropical  Andes  is 
complemented  with  a  social  diversity  in  terms  of  the  variety  of  institutions  defining  the  technology, 
population and land distribution across villages, even within a same municipality.  
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Variable
16  Var. 
range 
Region 
means 
id=169 
Vereda CUCO  
83 households 
id=158 
DIMISA 
223 
households 
id=32 
CARRASPOZAL 
16 households 
id=125 
CORTADERA 
112 
households 
Population density 
(Households/ha.-
adj) 
(POPDENAD) 
> 0  0.0923 
0.2170 
(adj) 
0.1460 
0.2745(adj) 
0.5718 
1.0502 (adj) 
0.0398 
0.0859 (adj) 
0.0234 
0.0538 (adj) 
Land  inequality 
(GINI  adjusted) 
(GINIADJ) 
(0,1)  0.5410  0.7272  0.3527  0.2579  0.6762 
Land tenure Index 
(TENUINDX) 
(0,1)  0.5133  0.0003  0.4599  0.6004  0.516 
Farming  system’s 
technological 
sustainability 
(SPRINDX) 
(0,1)  0.2468  0.109  0.4064  0.2584  0.2575 
                                                 
16  Later  on  I  will  introduce  in  detail  the  variables  of  the  model,  but  for  clarity  purposes  some  short 
definitions may be  useful. The Natural  Capital Index reflects the status of biodiversity, resilience  and 
biological  productivity  of  the  village  ecosystems.  The  Land  Tenure  Index  measures  the  degree  of 
ownership by the operator of the farm, and at the village level a area-weighted average. The Farming 
system' s technological sustainability measures the degree of sustainable practices within the farms. The 
Index of environmental goods and services (BSAINDX) measures the state the village “local commons” 
through a degree of environmental goods or bads from the conservation or degradation of water, soil and 
forest resources respectively  
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Land  use  pattern 
(Crops  area  %) 
(PCROPS) 
(0,1)  0.1856  0.192  0.7498  0.2163  0.0394 
Land  use  pattern 
(Pastures area %) 
(PPAST) 
(0,1)  0.4343  0.61  0.1907  0.7836  0.1907 
Natural  Capital 
Index (NKINDX) 
(0,1)  0.4379  0.4739  0.4956  0.4554  0.4389 
Index  of 
environmental 
goods  and 
services 
(BSAINDX) 
(-1,1)  -0.1286  -0.6447  -0.0558  -0.1149  -0.0566 
Table (2). Selected villages’ different combinations of land distribution, population density 
and quality of their local commons. 
 
A  closer  look  inside  the  village  should  help  clarify  these  situations.  Notice  that  the 
indicators  being  used  are  village  level  variables,  and  as  such  are  the  net  result  of 
different  types  of  farming  systems  and  land  uses  within  the  village.  In  fact,  the 
observation of these variables led the IDEADE research then to lower the level to the 
household  and  the  farming  system  to  understand  the  logic  of  these  ecological, 
technological and institutional factors.  
 
A first approach to the interaction of the variables suggested that the choice of farming 
practices and land use patterns is determined by the available natural capital in the 
farm, and institutional factors such access and tenure of land, labor and other inputs 
availability, determined also by income. Such decisions should then generate different 
effects  into  the  off-farm  and  downstream  components  of  the  village  commons.  
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Examples  are  water  and  soil  contamination  and  erosion,  loss  of  natural  vegetation, 
among others. These side effects from the farming systems determine then the level of 
sustainability at the village level in terms of a reduction of the available natural capital 
for present and next generations on the one side, and the reduction of land productivity, 
income or malnutrition on the community members. 
 
 
a.  Population and land distribution in the Chicamocha region. 
 
The following table introduces part of this argument by suggesting first that households 
may choose different farming systems (sustainable or unsustainable ones) depending 
on the institutional setting they are facing in their villages. Moreover, certain institutional 
variables  may  be  more  compatible  with  some  farming  systems  than  others.  For 
instance,  farming  practices  that  enhance  the  long-run  soil  productivity  by  controlling 
erosion may be more compatible with villages where land tenure and access can be 
secured  and  less  likely  in  villages  with  absentee  large  landholders  fearing  that 
environment  enhancing  practices  by  sharecroppers  may  undermine  the  owner’s 
property rights over the land. Another case is when the local labor market may interact 
with the farming practices
17. More populated villages will create a higher supply of labor, 
reducing the use of chemical inputs for fertilization and pest control and increasing labor 
intensive  practices  (e.g.  manual  weeding)  that  cause  much  less  impacts  on  the 
ecosystems. 
                                                 
17  Daily  labor  mobility  across  municipalities  and  even  villages  is  unlikely  due  to  geographical  and 
infrastructure  conditions.  Except  for  specific  harvesting  and  planting  peaks,  most  labor  supply  within 
villages comes from the existing households.  
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FARMING SYSTEMS (INPUTS, OUTPUTS, PRACTICES, LAND USES)   
  Unsustainable: 
-High use of pesticides and chemical 
fertilizers 
-Residual effects on soils and water 
-Monoculture practices in crops and 
pastures 
-Elimination of natural life in soils and 
vegetation 
-Extensive (grazing) livestock systems 
-Soil compactation and natural pastures 
exhaustion 
  Sustainable: 
-Biological control and IPM practices 
-Low impact on soils, water streams and 
deposits 
-Organic byproducts recycled 
-Crops and land rotation  
-Rotation of crops and managed pastures 
-Multipurpose livestock systems 
Weak- unequal: 
-Unclear 
definition of 
property rights 
-Unequal 
distribution of 
land and 
landlessness 
-Restricted 
access to rural 
credit 
-Free riding 
yields high 
individual 
benefits 
  Scenario A: (Stable) 
“Tragedy-of-the-Commons” or 
“Prisoners’ Dilemma” 
“Tragedy of the Commons” - 
Prisoners’ Dilemma scenario: 
-Property rights undefined or unclear 
-Free riding on public (open access) 
lands to over extract forest products 
and services. 
-Low use of local labor inducing 
migration 
 
  Scenario B: (Unstable) 
 
-Sustainable farming systems cannot 
persist since restricted access to land 
and other resources induce shifts to 
technologies that yield short run 
returns for subsistence 
 
¬￿May evolve to scenario A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
N
S
T 
I 
T
U
T 
I 
O
N
S 
Strong-
Egaliatirian: 
-Access to land 
and credit 
-Cooperation 
and community 
participation is 
socially valued 
and recognized 
-Free riding is 
socially 
punished 
 
 
  Scenario C: (Unstable) 
 
-Higher (cheaper) supply of 
community labor induce substitution 
of external (chemical) inputs for 
labor and other local resources. 
-Social valuation of cooperation and 
access to resources may induce a 
shift to technologies that encourage 
conservation and higher provision of 
environmental goods and services. 
  May evolve to scenario D 
® 
  Scenario D: (Stable) 
  “Cooperation-Collective 
Action” 
-Conservation of water, soils and 
forests.  
-Common Property Regimes evolve 
and succeed. 
-Social and biological diversities 
empowered. 
-Higher use of community labor 
-People’s cooperation for 
conservation offsets pressures over 
environment from people’s needs for 
food, fiber and energy 
Table (3) Interaction between institutions and farming systems 
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In general, according to the argument in the table, farmers will find it more adequate to 
choose farming practices, inputs use, and land uses, more compatible with the type of 
institutions in the village and therefore stable scenarios would me more likely to be A 
and D in the diagram. 
 
Although it might be clear how wealth inequality may undermine the possibilities for 
conserving the local commons, it does not necessarily mean under this argument that 
villages with greater inequality will have proportionally lower levels of conservation of 
their ecosystems. In fact the observation of the data from this region does not support 
this  claim.  Moreover,  it  does  not  support  either  the  Olsonian  claim  that  inequality 
improves the level of conservation through the privileged group effect. 
 
Following the table and diagram above, I should be able to introduce in more detail the 
argument  that  population  density  and  land  distribution  (or  group  heterogeneity)  may 
interact  in  determining  the  individual  effect  that  each  of  these  have  on  the  level  of 
conservation or degradation of the local commons in the village. 
 
The following Table (4) provides some of the ways that these two variables seem to 
interact in these villages. Assuming only two options or extremes (low and high) for both 
variables, we could combine some of the most important contributions from empirical 
and theoretical works.   
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      Population density 
      High    Low 
 
 
 
High 
GINI 
  Tragedy of open access resources: 
(Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis; Baland 
and Platteau) 
-Demand pressures from the 
powerless and landless prevails 
(needs for fiber, food and energy). 
-Less village area under sustainable 
farming systems. 
- Land constraints induce higher 
pressure over scarce soils, water and 
vegetation. 
  Privileged effects 
(Inputs prices hypothesis): Low wages 
paid by landlords allow them to substitute 
capital for labor. Less use of chemicals, 
higher use of labor. 
(Olson hypothesis): 
-Powerful landholders derive greater 
benefits from conservation, and depend 
less on land under agriculture 
production. 
-Smaller pressure from fewer landless 
farmers over commons. 
-Lower wages paid by landlords increase 
labor intensive practices, lower capital 
(chemical) intensive farming systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communit
y 
Inequality 
(Group 
Heterogen
eity) 
 
 
Low 
GINI 
  Cooperation-adaptation-
Innovation (Boserup hypothesis; 
Efficient redistribution Bardhan, 
Bowles and Gintis) 
-More village area under more 
sustainable practices. 
-Higher (cheaper) supply of village 
labor required for sustainable 
practices. 
 
Higher cooperation 
Inconclusive zone? (Baland and Plateau) 
Table (4) Cross-effects between population pressure and inequality (group heterogeneity) 
 
Therefore, introducing the possibility of these cross-effects, several of the alternative 
explanations may still be valid, but under more specific conditions. For instance, the 
privileged  group  explanation  by  Olson  (1965)  could  accepted  for  cases  where  the 
population to land ratio is low enough that the negative effects from inequality on the 
commons be overpowered by the positive investments by the privileged ones. Without 
invalidating  such  possibility,  a  severe  inequality  when  the  population  size  is  greater 
would create through the same balance, a net negative effect on the commons due to 
the greater effect of the poorer pressuring over the natural resources for subsistence. 
 
 
b.  Econometric evidence of the cross-effects 
 
The econometric analysis could be performed by using the spatial data set constructed 
during the mentioned study in a rural Andean region in Colombia, in the middle of the 
Chicamocha  (Boyaca)  watershed  (IDEADE,  1994,  1995).  A  general  model  was  
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developed  to  explain,  through  a  system  of  equations,  how  rural  institutions,  farming 
systems technology and land uses interacted with natural capital determining the level 
of conservation or degradation of a village. The statistical unit was the village, and the 
data set  was constructed using  Geographical  Information  Systems (GIS)  in order  to 
overlap  different  layers  of  ecological  and  socio-economic  data  collected  through  an 
exhaustive field work and the use of remote sensing techniques (aerial and satellite 
images)
18. 
 
Such systemic approach inspired the following system of equations that could allow a 
statistical analysis of these relationships. The system of equations (I, IIa, IIb, IIc,IIIa, IIIb) 
corresponds to a recursive system, and therefore could be estimated using ordinary 
least  squares  for  each  equation  independently.  The  last  equation  (IV)  is  then  the 
reduced form of the system and can also be estimated using OLS. The description of 
the variables used in the estimation is presented in Table (5) in next page. 
                                                 
18 The spatial unit used for the analysis is the "vereda" (village) assumed as a group of households with 
similar bioregional conditions. Traditionally the boundaries of veredas have corresponded due to historical 
reasons in these Andean regions to watershed features, namely, water streams or mountain peaks and 
ridges. Many of these villages emerged after the breakdown of larger feudal forms of land control during 
the Colony period. Using such spatial unit, and with the help of GIS, the different data layers (ecological 
and economic) could be made comparable.  
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Description  Data sources and 
method 
Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
BSAINDX: Index (-1,1) of the net state of the village 
local commons in terms of  water, soil and forest 
resources. It reflects the level of environmental goods 
or bads either downstream or on-site within the village. 
Map of environmentally 
critical and valuable 
areas based on the 
‘landscape ecology’ 
approach (IDEADE, 
1992). 
-0.1286  0.3859 
NKINDX: Index (0,1) of natural capital based on the 
ecological health of the ecosystem, where factors 
such as diversity, stability and ecological productivity 
of the ecosystems were weighted. 
Map of landscape 
ecology units. Based on 
biodiversity, productivity 
and resilience factors. 
0.4380  0.0472 
SPRINDX: Technological sustainability Index (0,1). 
Based on rankings for the 42 different types of farming 
systems and subsystems found in the region. The 
factors consider inputs use, process and outputs for 
each farming system and gives greater weights to 
practices friendlier with natural resources. 
-Rapid Rural Appraisal 
interviews. 
-Map of farming 
systems. 
0.2468  0.0560 
PCROPS: Percentage (0,1) of the village area in crops 
production, calculated using remote sensing and GIS 
techniques. 
GIS interpretation. 
Farming systems map 
0.1856  0.1400 
PPAST: Percentage (0,1) of village area in pastures 
land use and also calculated using remote sensing 
and GIS techniques. 
GIS interpretation. 
Farming systems map 
0.4342  0.2000 
POPDEADJ: Population density adjusted by land 
quality. (Households per ha., POP>0). The estimation 
of households was based on photo interpretation 
(remote sensing) with aerial photography and field 
work verification. Land has been adjusted for slope, 
water and roads access for comparability purposes. 
GIS-Remote sensing of 
rural households. 
0.2170  0.2018 
GINIADJ: Adjusted gini coefficient (0,1) of land 
operation. Based on the distribution of the number of 
farms among different (adjusted) size ranges, and 
using the Lorenz curve model. Farm areas were 
estimated using the thiessen polygons method and 
areas were adjusted using a ‘land potential’ set of 
factors including soils quality, slope, and roads 
access. 
GIS-Remote sensing. 
Thiessen polygons 
method and covariance 
method for estimating 
the Lorenz curve. 
0.5410  0.1543 
P102: Percentage (0,1) of the total area of the vereda 
(village) with land holdings greater that 10 has. (here 
assumed as ‘larger farms’). 
GIS-Remote sensing. 
Farm sizes adjusted for 
biophysical factors. 
0.6698  0.2493 
TENUINDX: Land tenure index (0,1) based on the 
farming systems analysis and  based on the degree of 
ownership of the land by the farmer (operator). 
Farming systems 
analysis, interviews, 
visits. 
0.5133  0.1439 
Note: Areas for calculating population density and land distribution (gini) have also been adjusted for 
slope, roads, and water access to the household using GIS techniques, in order to allow comparisons 
between different qualities of land.  
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Table 5. Variables description and statistics (n=161 villages (veredas)) 
 
In  order  to  test  for  the  possible  cross-effects,  a  variable  is  included  for  the  OLS 
estimations, where POPINE = POP * GINI. Therefore, the system of equations and the 
respective estimation coefficients is: 
 
(I)    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 5 4 3 2 1 PPAST PCROPS SPRINDX NK BSAINDX a a a a a + + + + =  
 
(IIa) ) ( ) 102 ( ) * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 6 5 34 4 3 2 1 TEN P GINI POP GINI POP NK SPRINDX b b b b b b b + + + + + + =  
 
(IIb)  ) ( ) 102 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 6 5 4 3 2 1 TEN P GINI POP NK PCROPS g g g g g g + + + + + =  
 
(IIc)  ) ( ) 102 ( ) * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 6 5 34 4 3 2 1 TEN P GINI POP GINI POP NK PPAST d d d d d d d + + + + + + =  
 
(IIIa)  ) * ( ) ( ) ( 102 34 4 3 1 GINI POP GINI POP P f f f f + + + =  
 
(IIIb)  ) * ( ) ( ) ( 34 4 3 1 GINI POP GINI POP TENUNIDX y y y y + + + =  
 
 
Thus, the marginal effect of inequality on BSA in the reduced form, due to the cross 
effects between population and land distribution, (￿BSA/￿INE) is as follows 
 
    Reduced Form: 
 
(IV)  ) * ( ) ( ) ( 34 4 3 1 GINI POP GINI POP BSAINDX r r r r + + + =  
 
 
Where  ￿3  and  ￿34  depend  on  the  values  of  several  coefficients  in  the  system  of 
equations. However, the reduced form allows us to estimate directly such net effect. If 
￿34 results significant, the hypotheses if the cross-effects would be confirmed from the 
empirical  evidence.  Moreover,  if  ￿3  and  ￿34  have  opposite  signs,  there  would  be  a 
threshold level for inequality GINI) where the marginal effect ∂BSA/∂POP changes from 
one sign to the other. In fact, this is the result found. The table in next page presents the 
estimated  system  of equations  with  their coefficients,  t-values,  and  the  standardized 
coefficients for comparisons across variables. 
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Equations in the system and the reduced form equation (IV) 
Explanatory variables 
and coefficients in each 
equation 
Eq. (I) 
BSA 
Eq. (IIa) 
SPRINDX 
Eq. (IIb) 
PCROPS
19 
Eq. (IIc) 
PPAST 
Eq. (IV) 
Reduced 
form: 
BSAINDX 
SPIDE (￿￿3) 
(Tech. sustainability) 
2.7323 
(6.469)* 
0.3961 
---  ---  ---  --- 
PCROP (￿￿4) 
(Area% in crops) 
-0.7205 
(-4.977)* 
-0.2614 
---  ---  ---  --- 
PPAST (￿￿5) 
(Area% in pasture) 
-0.3357 
(-3.032)* 
-0.1743 
---  ---  ---  --- 
NK 
(￿￿2,￿2,￿2,￿2,￿2) 
(Natural capital) 
3.9059 
(8.354)* 
0.4781 
0.3393 
(4.521)* 
0.2865 
-0.0017 
(-0.010) 
0.0003 
-0.5738 
(-2.038)* 
-0.1353 
5.2795 
(11.875* 
0.6463 
 POPDENAD 
(￿3,￿3,￿3,￿3) 
(Population density) 
---  0.2434 
(3.154)* 
0.8782 
0.3254 
(6.139)* 
0.4691 
-0.5246 
(-1.812)* 
-0.5285 
0.9023 
(2.042)* 
0.4719 
Inequality (GINIADJ) 
(￿4,￿4,￿4,￿4) 
 (Land inequality gini) 
---  -0.0113 
(-0.370) 
-0.0312 
-0.1499 
(-2.658)* 
-0.1652 
-0.5537 
(-4.822)* 
-0.4265 
0.7382 
(4.002)* 
0.2952 
POP*GINIADJ 
(￿34,￿34,￿34,￿34) 
---  -0.4988 
(-3.005)* 
-0.7490 
---  1.5539 
(2.495)* 
0.6516 
-3.2564 
(-3.299)* 
P102   
(￿5,￿5,￿5,￿5) 
(Village area% in large 
farms) 
---  0.023 
(1.272) 
0.1028 
-0.1287 
(-3.210)* 
-0.2292 
0.0578 
(0.850) 
0.0172 
--- 
TENUINDX 
(￿6,￿6,￿6,￿6) 
(Land tenure) 
---  0.1744 
(6.975)* 
0.4484 
-0.0179 
(-0.322) 
-0.0184 
0.6498 
(6.930)* 
0.4670 
--- 
  n (No. villages)  160  160  160  160  160 
  Adjusted R
2:  0.5656  0.3884  0.5126  0.3289  0.5318 
  Equation F-test:  53.087  17.933  34.659  14.067  46.430 
Table (6) Regression results (OLS) (n=160 villages) Notes: Each cell presents the 
estimated coefficient, its t-ratios in parenthesis, and the standardized coefficient; * 
One-tail statistically significant at 95%. 
 
 
                                                 
19 The PCROPS equation with cross-effects did not pass a Chow test to perform better than the linear 
one.  
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The overall performance of the estimation can be verified through the percentage of 
variability in the dependent variables explained by the right hand side for each equation, 
the  F-test  for  each  equation,  and  the  significance  of  most  variables.  Most  of  the 
expected signs were obtained. The model estimated here performed better than the 
simple linear one, giving therefore statistical support for the cross-effects model. The 
non-significance of some of the right hand variables in some of the equations, although 
the  signs  correspond  to  the  expected  ones,  may  be  caused  by  multiple  collinearity 
among the institutional variables
20. 
 
Let  us  see  in  detail  how  the  estimation  provides  some  evidence  of  the  theoretical 
argument.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  ecological  quality  of  the  local  commons  is 
determined  by  forces  working  in  opposite  direction,  all  related  to  the  decisions  by 
farmers  within  their  own  land  and  decisions  when  using  the  local  commons.  Those 
decisions  then  are  determined  by  the  institutions  that  determine  the  availability  or 
access to inputs such as land, labor and capital. 
 
The first equation simply explains how the local commons proxy (BSAINDX) is mostly 
determined  by  the  available  stock  of  natural  capital  (NKINDX)  and  the  technology 
choices by the farmers through land uses and farming practices. In general two types of 
decisions  by  farmers  affect  the  commons,  one,  their  choice  of  farming  practices 
(SPRINDX)  which  is  a  composite  of  choices  with  respect  to  inputs  use,  production 
practices,  and  by-products  of  agriculture.  We  will  assume  that  capital  intensive 
technologies are less appropriate for the environment than labor intensive ones, and 
also that crops tend to be more labor intensive than livestock farming systems. The 
second  type  of  decision  is  the  distribution  of  their  own  land  in  crops  (PCROPS), 
pastures (PPAST) and natural vegetation (PNATU). According to our definition of the 
commons, SPRINDX should have a positive impact on BSA; and with respect to land 
use patterns, some inconclusiveness remains except for PNATU which we could expect 
to have a positive association with BSAINDX. Regarding pastures and crops land uses, 
one could argue in both signs of the relation depending basically on then type of crops 
and livestock practices. 
 
Equations (IIa, IIb, IIc) then reflect how the institutional variables affect the technological 
choices which in turn determine the effect on the village ecosystems as expressed in 
the reduced form equation. However, reducing the attention to the reduced form may 
ignore the effects that operate in opposite directions, for instance, from the population 
density. As can be verified through the results, while population density increases the 
village area in crops and pastures which in turn reduce BSA, population density also 
                                                 
20 For instance, one should expect land tenure and inequality combined with population density to be 
related. Although single correlations are not strong enough, linear combination of the three could create 
collinearity problems.  
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increases the amount of more sustainable farming practices (SPRINDX) which has a 
positive effect on BSA. Moreover, as discussed before, the net effect estimated through 
the  reduced  form  may  suffer  from  statistical  error  from  several  coefficients  in  the 
system. 
 
In order to concentrate on the cross-effects of population and inequality on the village 
environmental outcome, the following three dimensional surface illustrates how the level 
of one variable determine the marginal effect of the other on BSA. Clearly, the slope of 
population density (POPDEADJ)  on BSA decreases as inequality (GINIADJ) increases 
and eventually becomes negative. Such claim is supported by the regression results. If 
using  the  estimated  coefficients  in  the  reduced  form,  after  the  GINI  level  passes  a 
threshold level of GINI = (￿3 / ￿34) = 0.9023/3.2564 = 0.277. Notice also that from the 
data descriptive statistics and the distribution graphs in the appendix, the mean for GINI 
is  0.541 with a Std.Dev of 0.1543, suggesting that for a large portion of the region 
inequality is creating more harm than good to the local commons. 
Finally, the evidence of the cross-effects can be also found in the rest of the estimation 
results through the structural equations given that in most cases the variables were 
found significant. The interpretation of similar surfaces such as the one shown can be 
derived for the equations (IIa,and Iic).  For instance, ∂SPRINDX/∂POPDEADJ becomes 
negative for GINIADJ￿ > 0.488. Thus, for high inequality levels, an increase in population 
density reduces the adoption of sustainable farming practices, or, for villages with better 
distribution of land population density provides incentives and possibilities for farms to 
shift to labor intensive land uses and technologies. 
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Figure  5.  Three-dimensional  surface  generated  with  the  data  to  illustrate  the  cross-
effects of population and inequality on the local commons. 
 
 
4.  Final Discussion: Natural and social capital, Natural and Social resilience 
 
In another passage, Malthus insists on the problem of distribution and how it may affect 
the  outcomes  with  respect  to  his  main  point  on  the  different  rates  of  agriculture 
production and population growths: 
 
“An  unfavourable  distribution  of  produce,  by  prematurely  diminishing  the  demand  for 
labour, might retard the increase of food at an early period, in the same manner as if 
cultivation and population had been further advanced;” [Malthus (1830): pp. 239] 
 
What could be better than Malthus himself to revisit with more complexity the problem of 
population  pressures  on  the  environment?.  ‘Population  pressure’  is  the  term  mostly 
used in the so called Neomalthusian literature to express that larger population and a 
limited amount of resources in the ecosystems (land originally) will have to result in the 
exhaustion  of  the  ecosystem  because  its  renewability  is  overpowered  by  the 
exponential  growth  of  population,  while  agricultural  growth  increases  at  lower  rates.  
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Thus, two villages with similar area and natural base but one with double the population 
would indistinctly make the latter end up in ecological collapse more rapidly under such 
argument.  
 
However, and consistent with Malthus, this is relative to the institutional setting (land 
distribution, tenure among others), and also relative to the technological systems the 
farmers choose given the ecological and institutional constraints they face. In our case, 
it is not the retard in the increase of food production but in the provision of the public 
goods that the local commons generate for the community. As I argued  before, the 
population issue has two sides, the ‘pressure’ side where people’s needs for products 
from those local commons are taken as proportional to the number of people, and an 
ignored related to people’s capacity to overcome the coordination failures from such 
demand. 
 
The  theoretical  discussion  and  the  evidence  above  provide  new  elements  to  bring 
together  the  importance  of  several  elements  recently  emerging  from  the  social  and 
ecological  sciences.  While  social  diversity  and  social  capital  have  been  increasingly 
recognized in the literature as key explanation for the success of collective action and 
cooperation within communities, ecology and systems approaches have been providing 
the basis for understanding the economic importance of natural capital and the main 
factors for healthy ecosystems. In general natural capital, and local commons would be 
an  example,  benefits  more  communities  when  their  biological  productivity,  resilience 
and biodiversity are greater. With similar arguments we could state then that villages 
and communities with greater levels of social diversity, productivity and resilience will 
present better conditions for overcoming prisoners’ dilemma situations and be able to 
cooperate  for  providing  these  and  other  local  public  goods.  Diverse  and  therefore 
resilient communities rely on more equal institutions to be able to overcome challenges 
from increasing population and scarcity of natural resources. More equal distribution of 
the  land,  as  in  the  case  discussed  here,  provides  the  incentives  in  the  village  for 
adopting more sustainable farming practices and land  use  patterns that balance the 
need  for  food,  fiber  and  energy,  while  preserving  the  biodiversity,  resilience  and 
biological productivity of the local commons of the village expressed in the stock and 
relations between land, trees and water. Socially diverse and resilient communities are 
made of diverse and resilient ecosystems and farming systems. That is the value of 
group heterogeneity and an alternative approach to this problem in collective action. 
 
After  reviewing  some  of  the  reasons  why  inequality  may  affect  the  conservation  or 
mismanagement of village level commons such as water, soil and forest resources, I 
have attempted to go further in the discussion and explore the possibility that cross-
effects between population density and land inequality may alter slightly the predictions 
that the recent literature is providing on these issues. Recent developments (Bardhan 
(1993),  Baland  and  Platteau  (1996),  Bardhan,  Bowles  and  Gintis,  1997)  have  been 
counter  arguing  the  Olsonian  prediction  that  group  heterogeneity  (inequality)  will  
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increase the likelihood that collective action emerges. Meanwhile the Neo-malthusian 
environmental  argument  persists  compatible  with  Olson’s  claim  that  group  size  will 
reduce the possibility of such collective action. The basic argument I have developed is 
that  the  impact  that  population  size  has  on  the  level  of  conservation  of  the  local 
commons is mediated by the level of village inequality in several ways. Highly populated 
villages will be more likely to manage sustainably their local commons if the distribution 
of  land  is  more  equal;  and  unequal  villages  could  generate  conditions  for  local 
commons conservation under low population pressures. In other words, this claim would 
be consistent with the old (but less publicized) argument by Malthus that the distribution 
of property may indeed retard or accelerate the operation of the population checks on 
production and land productivity in particular. 
 
The econometric evidence presented confirms these predictions through the estimation 
of such cross-effects by creating a three-dimensional surface relationship in which the 
slopes of both population density and land inequality on the status of the village local 
commons are mediated by each other. 
 
In fact, when looking at the estimated surface from a two dimensional perspective, it 
may in fact be misinterpreted as an inverted “U” curve where the environmental quality 
of  the  local  commons  decreases  with  inequality  to  a  certain  point  and  eventually 
catches up. Interestingly, some of these arguments have been emerging as plausible 
explanations  of  relations  between  inequality  and  environmental  quality,  including 
empirical evidence using cross-country data. Moreover, some of these arguments have 
been proposed as extrapolations of the so called “Kusnetz” curve to the environmental 
discourse. 
 
A  three  dimensional  explanation  of  the  empirical  results  changes  dramatically  the 
interpretation of inequality and local commons. Under the two dimensional explanation 
the gainers from inequality would lead the local commons conservation and the poorer 
will benefit, even free-ride, from such efforts. In our 3D world, this explanation would 
happen  only for  villages  with  low  population  sizes.  But  the  more populated villages, 
where in fact dependence on their local commons is even more crucial, the effect of 
inequality can be quite opposite. 
The  argument  here  defended  results  even  more  interesting  when  one  looks  at  the 
recent demographic trends in Third World countries where the rural migration to new 
agricultural frontiers has been increasing the population densities of settlements with 
key but fragile ecosystems (e.g. tropical rainforests, humid forests, high cloud forests, 
paramos). Given that the land productivity of these new regions is much lower under 
conventional  agriculture,  and  that  the  flow  of  environmental  services  of  such  local 
commons  is  highly  dependant  on  the  possibility  of  collective  action  within  their 
communities,  a  call  for  sound  policies  for  land  distribution  seems  more  urgent,  and 
eventually  more  cost-effective,  that  costly  attempts  by  governments  to  establish 
exclusion of local users from national conservation parks which have proved ineffective.  
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